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ABSTRACT
Security Needs and the Performance of the Defense Industry
by Andreas Blume and Asher Tishler*
Today, leading defense firms are concentrated into just two distinct blocs  those based
in the US and those in Western Europe. All US defense firms and most European ones
are private. Market structure may thus play an important role in determining
procurement levels as well as defense policies in the US and Europe.
This paper focuses on the interactions between defense needs and market structure. It
presents a model in which two producer blocs (representing the US and Europe)
produce an identical homogeneous defense good. The rest of the world purchases the
defense good from the two producer countries. The security level of each of the two
producing countries depends on its purchase of the defense good relative to the amount
of defense good purchased by the rest of the world. Each country measures its security
level against a target that it sets for itself.
The main results of this paper are: (1) Generally, the total world quantity of the defense
good is lower when the governments of the producers of the defense good pay the world
price (rather than the marginal production cost plus a markup) to their defense
industries. (2) The net defense cost (government expenditure on the defense good minus
the profit of the defense industry) of each producing country is lower when producing-
country governments pay the world price to their own defense industries. (3)
Government expenditure on the defense good and the net defense cost for each
producing-country are smaller when the number of defense firms in each country is
relatively small. (4) Target security levels affect the optimal number of firms in each of
the two producing countries. Higher target security levels result in a larger number of
defense firms. (5) Multiple equilibria in the game where the developed countries
independently choose their own procurement rules are possible.
Keywords: defense industry, technology, security level, market structure
                                                
* We are grateful to M. Balch, A. Daughety, D. Dvir, G. Fethke, A. James, A.R. Nobay,
J. F. Reinganum, W.P. Rogerson, A. Shenhar and D. Webb for valuable comments and
suggestions.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Sicherheitsbedürfnisse und die Leistungsfähigkeit der Rüstungsindustrie
Heute sind die führenden Rüstungsunternehmen in zwei unterschiedlichen Regionen konzen-
triert: in den USA und in Westeuropa. Alle US-Unternehmen und die meisten europäischen
Unternehmen sind in Privatbesitz. Insofern kann die Marktstruktur als wichtige Einflußgröße
des Beschaffungsniveaus und der Verteidigungspolitik in den USA und Europa angesehen
werden.
Der Beitrag konzentriert sich auf die Interaktion zwischen Verteidigungsbedürfnissen und
Marktstruktur. Es wird ein Modell vorgestellt, in dem zwei Produzentenblöcke (die USA
und Europa) ein identisches, homogenes Rüstungsgut produzieren. Der Rest der Welt kauft
die Rüstungsgüter von den beiden Herstellerländern. Das Sicherheitsniveau jedes der beiden
Länder hängt von seiner Beschaffung der Rüstungsgüter im Vergleich zum Beschaffungs-
volumen an Rüstungsgüter durch den Rest der Welt ab. Jedes Land bestimmt sein Sicher-
heitsniveau im Vergleich zu einem selbstgesteckten Ziel.
Das Hauptergebnis besagt: (1) Im allgemeinen ist das weltweite Gesamtvolumen an
Rüstungsgütern niedriger, wenn die Regierung der Herstellerländer der Rüstungsgüter den
Weltpreis an ihre Industrien zahlen (im Unterschied zu einer Preisbildung nach Grenzkosten
der Produktion plus Zuschlag). (2) Die Nettoverteidigungsausgaben (staatliche Ausgaben für
Rüstungsgüter minus der Gewinne der Rüstungsindustrie) eines jeden Herstellerlandes sind
geringer, wenn die Herstellerländer den Weltpreis an ihre eigene Industrie zahlen. (3) Die
Staatsausgaben für die Rüstungsgüter und die Nettoverteidigungsausgaben für jedes Herstel-
lerland sind geringer, wenn die Anzahl an Rüstungsunternehmen in jedem Land verhältnis-
mäßig gering ist. (4) Die Höhe des gewünschten Sicherheitsniveaus beeinflußt die optimale
Anzahl von Unternehmen in jedem der beiden Herstellerländer. Höhere Sicherheitsniveaus
führen zu einer höheren Anzahl an Rüstungsunternehmen. (5) Multiple Gleichgewichte des
Spiels, in dem die entwickelten Länder unabhängig von ihrem eigenen Beschaffungsniveaus
entscheiden, sind möglich.
11.  Introduction
Since the end of the cold war, national defense budgets have shrunk drastically while
production capacity has changed little. Consequently, export markets have become more
competitive. Moreover, despite the increased competition and the use of cheaper, off-the-shelf
commercial components instead of specially designed military ones, the prices of new weapons
and defense systems seem to be rising inexorably. Economic necessity is wearing away the
defense industrys segregation, forcing companies and governments to cooperate as well as to
compete across borders. The outcome of this consolidation has been the emergence of a small
group of defense giants in the US and Europe. Size, it seems, is a crucial factor in the defense
industry (The Economist, 1997).
In this new environment, economic pressures are pushing defense industries up against
restraints on the proliferation of advanced conventional military capabilities. This is because the
best customers for sophisticated weapon systems are in regions where sales are likely to feed
existing tensions and old disputes may erupt into war. Additionally, aggressive marketing by
cash-strapped companies fighting to stay competitive may waken dormant rivalries.
Today, more than ever before, strong military powers are countries that have state-of-the-
art technological know-how and the economic means to develop it into sophisticated weapon
systems. Platforms such as the air-superiority fighter jet, the ballistic missile, precision guided
weapon systems, integrated air defense systems, and integrated intelligence systems embody
levels of sophistication and lethality that separate those who can produce and use them from all
others (Ben Israel (1998), Rogerson (1994), The Economist (1998), James (1998a,b), Louscher,
Cook and Barto (1998), Dvir and Tishler (2000)).
The US government has actively encouraged the consolidation process of its defense
firms in order to reduce procurement costs and sustain a viable defense industry during a period
of declining defense budgets.  European companies, facing intense competition from the giant
US firms, are also being forced to consider consolidation within Europe and, lately, with
2American firms. Various political, economic and social developments have left the US and
Western Europe as the only strong military powers with state-of-the-art technological know-how
and the economic means to develop it into sophisticated weapon systems. Among these are the
demise of the USSR, political constraints across Europe, the policy of European governments to
purchase locally made  or at least European  defense systems (Cobble (1998), James (1998a),
Lovering (1998), Serfati (1998)), and the Pentagons buy American policy (Flamm (1998),
Markusen (1998)).
All the defense firms in the US and most of those in the European bloc are private. So,
market structure may play an important role in determining procurement levels as well as defense
policies in the US and Europe. (See Rogerson (1990, 1994), Kovacic and Smallwood (1994) and
Flamm (1998) on the procurement process in the US).
This paper presents a model of the interactions between defense needs and market
structure. The model represents two developed countries (corresponding to the US and Western
Europe) that produce an identical homogeneous defense good. The rest of the world includes
all the other countries in the world.  There is no production of defense goods in the rest of the
world. The two producer countries are allies (not enemies) but may have enemies in the rest of
the world. The rest of the world features a downward-sloping demand function for the defense
good and it purchases the defense good (produced by the two developed countries) at the
equilibrium world price. The security level of each of the two developed countries depends on
their purchase of the defense good relative to the amount of it that is purchased by the rest of the
world. Target security levels are determined by the countrys culture, social fabric, political
structure, religions, beliefs, etc.
The defense firms in the two producer countries play a Cournot game1. The optimal
behavior of the defense industries in these two countries is analyzed under two types of pricing
practices: (1) the government of each of the two producer countries purchases the defense good
                                                
1 Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) describe a two-stage game in which firms choose their capacity in the first stage
and engage in price competition in the second stage. They show that under some conditions the subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome of this game is identical to the outcome of the Cournot game that is used here.
3from its own defense industry at the world price and, (2) the price that the government of each of
the two producer countries pays to its own defense industry equals the marginal production cost
plus a markup.
Some of the results of this paper depend on strategic interaction between market structure
and security, while other results may be more intuitive and straightforward. First, a lower price of
the defense good shifts the worlds demand function to the right. This is the main reason why,
when the government of a developed country chooses to pay its own defense industry the world
price, the defense industry prefers to have more than one firm in the market. Second, government
expenditure on the defense good and the countrys net defense cost (government expenditure on
the defense good minus the profit of the defense industry) in the developed countries are smaller
when the number of the defense firms in each country is small, which may explain the current
consolidation process of the defense industries in these countries. Third, the developed countries
jointly prefer to pay their defense industries the world price (rather than marginal cost plus a
markup). However, multiple equilibria in the game where the developed countries independently
choose their own procurement rules are possible.
The other main results of this paper are as follows. First, the world price of the defense
good is higher when the governments of the developed countries pay the world price for their
purchase of the defense good than when they pay the marginal cost plus a reasonably small
markup. As a result, the purchases of the defense good by these countries, as well as the sales to
the rest of the world, are lower in this case. Hence, there are less weapon systems in the world
when governments choose to pay their defense industries the world price. The net defense cost of
each producing country is, generally, lower in this case. Second, a larger number of defense firms
in the developed countries makes the defense industries more competitive. This reduces the
world price of the defense good, and thereby increases sales of the defense good to the developed
countries and also to the rest of the world. Third, target security levels in the developed countries
affect the optimal number of firms in these countries. A higher target security level results in a
larger number of defense firms in each country. Fourth, if production of the defense good is
significantly more efficient in one of the two countries than in the other (due to a larger
4investment in R&D, say), that country may capture most or all of the exports of the defense good
to the rest of the world. The larger the number of defense firms in each of the two developed
countries, the more pronounced this phenomenon becomes. Finally, our analysis shows that
judging the defense industry on economic performance alone is misleading because this does not
take account of the threat from enemies (see Dvir and Tishler (2000) on this issue).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background and data on the
defense industry. Section 3 presents the concept of security and describes the model. In Section 4
the model is solved. Section 5 analyses solutions of the model under different pricing practices.
The profits of the defense industry and the optimal number of firms in that industry are derived in
Section 6. Section 7 compares solutions of the model under the two types of pricing practice.
Section 8 discusses different technologies, R&D, and the resulting exports of the defense
industry. Section 9 discusses policy issues and concludes.
2. Background
The reduction in defense spending, procurement, and exports around the globe is evident
from Tables 1 and 2. World military expenditures declined from $1203 billion in 1990 to $840
billion in 1994. During the same period, world defense budgets declined by over 30% (Louscher
et al. (1998)). These reductions are most notable in the developed countries (Table 1), in which
the share of defense spending in GDP declined by about 50% from 1985 to 1998. On average,
procurement budgets accounted for about 30% of total defense expenditure in the first half of the
nineties. This figure declined somewhat in the second half of the decade (Flamm (1998)). Table 2
clearly shows that global arms exports were much smaller than global procurements. That is, the
producer countries strictly enforced a buy local policy. Almost all of the procurements in the
US and Western Europe were from local producers (Table 3 in Louscher et al. (1998) shows that
most arms exports are to countries in the Third World).
5Table 1: Defense spending by major countries
Defense  Spending
%  of  GDP
Government
Spending
$ billion
1985 1990 1995 1998 1998
US 6.5 5.7 3.7 3.1 264
UK 5.3 4.2 3.0 2.8 40
France 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 37
Germany 3.1 2.8 1.8 1.4 32
     Source: The Economist (1998).
Table 2: Global Military Expenditure, Procurement, and Arms Exports
1990, 1994 ($ billion, 1994 prices)
1990 1994
Military Expenditure 989 677
Procurement Budget 361 252
Arms Exports 57 32
    Source: Louscher et al. (1998), The Economist (1997).
Figures 1 and 2 clearly show a concentration of leading defense firms into just two
distinct blocs   the US and Western Europe. With one exception, the 20 largest defense firms in
the world are all located in the US and Western Europe. In 1997, almost 60% of the defense sales
of the largest 100 defense firms in the world originated in the US, 34% in Europe, 4.5% in Japan,
1.6% in Israel, and 1.3% in other countries. This is no surprise. These countries are among the
few that have the technical capabilities to produce highly sophisticated weapon systems. They
have also long recognized the importance of exports to the survival of their defense firms. In
conclusion, we shall assume in this paper that producers of defense goods may be divided into
two distinct blocs  the US and Western Europe. Note also that Western Europe and the US are
allies.
6Source: James (1998b)
Figure 1: Sales of Top 20 Defense Firms in 1997
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Figure 2:  Share of 1997 Defense Sales by Top 100 Defense Firms 
Worldwide By National Origin of Firm
US (58.8%)
NATO Europe (32.1%)
Japan (4.5%)
Non-NATO Europe (1.7%)
Israel (1.6%)
Other (1.3%)
8Finally, as defense budgets plummeted, the US altered its policy towards defense industry
restructuring.  The tradition of opposition to mergers among large defense firms during the cold
war was reversed during the Clinton administration. During 1992-1997, four giant US defense
firms emerged as a consequence of this policy change (see Figure 3).
Figure 3:  Mergers and Acquisitions in the US defense Industry during 1992-1997
1992        1997
Lockheed
GD Forth Worth
GE Aerospace
Martin Marietta                                      Lockheed Martin
Loral
LTV Missiles
IBM-Fed Systems
Unisys
Boeing
McDonnell Douglas                               Boeing
Rockwell
Raytheon
E-Systems
Chrysler
TI Defense                                             Raytheon
Hughes Aerospace
GD Missiles
Magnavox
Grumman
LTV Aircraft                                         Northrop Grumman
Westinghouse
Logicon
Source: The Economist (1997), James (1998b).
9This consolidation process has had a profound impact on the industry. Table 3 shows the
reduction of the number of producers supplying selected types of weapon systems. A similar,
though much slower reduction has begun in Europe (Cobble (1998), the Economist (1997)) and
in Israel (Dvir and Tishler (2000)). Note, however, that the reduction in the number of defense
firms did not produce the savings anticipated, and surprisingly, few production lines have been
closed (Markusen (1998)). Consolidation has reduced competition, and brought about a creation
of a smaller number of defense manufacturers that are politically more powerful. This did not go
unnoticed by the Pentagon, which successfully blocked the proposed merger of Lockheed Martin
with Northrop in 1997, and the acquisition of Newport News by General Dynamics in 1999
(Wall Street Journal (1999)).
Table 3: Prime Contractors in US Defense Industry
Number of Contractors
1990 1998
Tactical Missiles 13 4
Strategic Missiles 3 2
Fixed Wing Aircraft 8 3
Rotary Wing Aircraft 4 3
Expendable Launch Vehicles 6 2
Satellites 8 5
Surface Ships 8 5
Torpedoes 3 2
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 6 4
Tracked Combat Vehicles 3 2
            Source: Flamm (1998), James (1998b).
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3. Security Level and the Defense Industry - the Basic Model
The security needs of a country are an expression of its desire and ability to deter war, or
if war is unavoidable, to win it without sustaining excessive damage or loss of life. What
amounts to excessive damage and loss of life is determined by the countrys culture, social
fabric, religions, beliefs, and legal political structure.  The amount of damage and loss of life that
may result from a war depend on the countrys defense capabilities relative to those of its
enemies. In reality, these defense capabilities are dependent on many factors  especially quantity
and quality of personnel and weapon systems.
The concept of winning a war is not a simple one. Moreover, it changes over time
because of changes in technology and other factors. There are many possible definitions and
outcomes of a war. In technologically advanced countries, most of the defense budget  is spent on
the development, acquisition, and maintenance of major modern weapon systems designed for
operation in large-scale wars. Hence this paper will be limited to the analysis of defense
capabilities needed to deter or win a major (all-out) war. That is, we do not analyze defense
systems and efforts that are designed specifically to deal with terror or minor local conflicts.
Conventional weapon systems currently available to most technologically advanced countries are
very potent. Therefore, unless the country wins the war quickly and convincingly it will suffer
damage and loss of life that will be perceived within the country as devastating. Achieving a
quick and convincing win requires a clear edge over the enemy (see Ben Israel (1998), Dvir and
Tishler (2000)). A country may gain such an edge by building a much larger army (more weapon
systems and personnel) than its enemy or, more importantly, weapon systems of distinctly higher
quality.
This paper develops a model of two developed countries, country A (representing the US)
and country B (representing Western Europe) which produce an identical homogeneous defense
good2. The defense good is an aggregate of modern platforms (fighter planes, missiles, integrated
weapon and intelligence systems, etc.) and their peripherals, as well as sophisticated munitions
                                                
2 Extending the model to several countries would complicate the presentation but would not change the nature of
the results.
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and other high-tech equipment. The rest of the world, denoted W, includes all the other
countries in the world. In this model there is no production of defense goods in the rest of the
world. Countries A and B are allies  not enemies  but they may have enemies or potential
enemies in the rest of the world3. The rest of the world features a downward-sloping demand
function for the defense good (the quantity demanded is inversely related to the world price).
The defense industries in countries A and B consist of K and N profit-maximizing firms,
respectively. Denote the output of the defense industry in country i by iY . The defense industries
in countries A and B sell their output to their own governments and to the rest of the world.
Country i buys defense goods only from its own defense industry (see Flamm (1998), James
(1998a,b), Markusen (1998) and Serfati (1998) on this issue). The defense industry in country i
must satisfy local demand by its government ( iiY ) before it is allowed to export the defense good
to the rest of the world ( WiY ). Clearly, i
W
i
i
i YYY =+ , i=A,B.
Security in each country is a function of the size of the countrys stock of weapon systems
relative to its enemies. Thus, the security, iS , of country i is dependent on two factors: the
amount of the defense product iiY  in country i, and the amount of the defense good in the rest of
the world (sold by the defense industries of countries A and B to the rest of the world) WB
W
A YY + .
In this study we define the level of security of each country as follows:
   ),/( WB
W
A
A
AA YYYS +=    (1a)
 and
   )./( WB
W
A
B
BB YYYS +=     (1b)
                                                
3 It is straightforward to show that the structure and nature of the solution of the model are unchanged when the
producing countries are not allies (the security level of each country depends on its purchase of the defense
good relative to the purchase of the defense good by all other countries in the world).
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 The rest of the world features the following demand function for the defense good:
WbYaP += ,   (2)
where WB
W
A
W YYY +≡ . The terms, a > 0, and b < 0 are known parameters. The rest of the world
buys the defense good at the world price, P, which is determined by the model.
We assume that the target security level of each country, 0iS  (see expression (1)), is
determined by military and political decision makers that assess the countrys potential enemies.
The target security level is exogenously given in this model. In addition, the number of defense
firms in each country is known and exogenously given. The decisions in this model are taken in
the following order:
Stage 1  conditional on 0iS , the government of each country commits to the amount of the
defense good that it will purchase from its defense industry. That is, each country seeks to make
its actual security level, iS , match its target security level 
0
iS  (which may be interpreted as a
minimization of the  quadratic loss function 20 )( ii SS − ).
Stage 2  given the governments commitments to purchase the defense good from their own
defense industries, and the rest of the worlds demand for the defense good, the defense firms in
countries A and B decide how much to produce in order to maximize their profits. Thus, the N+K
firms in countries A and B play a Cournot game to decide how much to produce and sell to the
rest of the world.
The model is solved by first solving the Cournot game among the N+K defense firms.
Then, given the reaction functions of the firms, the governments of A and B determine their
optimal purchase of the defense good (their commitment levels) such that the initial security
measures, 0iS , are simultaneously attained in both countries.
To simplify the presentation and analysis, but without loss of generality, we assume that
all the firms in country A are identical. Similarly, all the firms in country B are also identical. The
firms in country A may be different from those in country B. We also assume that each
13
government divides its purchase of the defense good (its commitment) equally among the firms
in its defense industry. The technology in country i is represented by the following quadratic cost
function ( ijY is the output of the jth firm in country i, i=A,B):
 222
1
10)( ijiijiiij YYYC ααα ++=  , (3)
where  i0α >0, i1α >0. We shall analyze cases in which i2α  is positive (increasing marginal cost)
or zero (constant marginal cost)4. Throughout the analysis we assume that a, the reservation price
of the rest of the world (see (2)) is greater than the marginal cost of production (for example, if
marginal costs are fixed, 022 == BA αα , then Aa 1α> , and Ba 1α> ).
4. Solution of the Model
The model is solved in two steps. First we need to solve stage 2, the Cournot game
among the N+K defense firms. Using the reaction functions derived for these firms, we then
solve stage 1, in which the governments determine their optimal purchase of the defense good
(their optimal commitment levels) such that the target security levels, 0iS , are simultaneously
attained in both countries. Clearly, the solution of the model depends on the price that each
government pays for its purchase of the defense good. Because most of the cost of R&D of the
defense industry in each country is borne by the government (Goolsbee (1998)), and because
each government purchases its defense goods only from its own industry (see James (1998a),
Markusen (1998) and Serfati (1998)), governments may request to pay less than the world price
for their own purchase of the defense good. In the following exposition, we assume that
government A and government B each independently choose one of two possible pricing
structures: they may purchase the defense good from their defense industry either at the world
price, or at a price which is equal to the marginal production cost of that countrys defense
industry plus a markup factor.
                                                
4  The results of this paper hold also when 0/)]2/()1[( 2 <<++++ ibNKNK α .
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Stage 2
The second stage solution is as follows. Suppose that government A purchases the
defense good at the world price. The profit function of firm 1 in country A is given by:
1Aπ = [ a + b(YWA1 + ∑
=
K
j
W
AjY
2
+ ∑
=
N
j
W
BjY
1
)](YWA1 +Y AA1 )
         - [ A0α +α A1 (YWA1 +Y AA1 )+ A22
1
α (YWA1 +Y AA1 )
2 ].       (4)
If government A purchases the defense good at marginal cost plus a markup, the profit
function of firm 1 in country A is given by:
1Aπ = [ a + b(YWA1 + ∑
=
K
j
W
AjY
2
+ ∑
=
N
j
W
BjY
1
)]YWA1  + 
A
A
W
A
A
AAA YYY 11121 )]()[1( +++ ααµ
           - [ A0α +α A1 (YWA1 +Y AA1 )+ A22
1
α (YWA1 +Y AA1 )
2 ],        (5)
where µ ≥ 0 is the markup factor. Note that the price that government A pays for the defense
good that it purchases from its defense industry equals )]()[1( 1121
W
A
A
AAA YY +++ ααµ .
Firm 1 in country A determines WAY 1  (its exports to the rest of the world) such that its
profits are maximized, conditional on exports of all the other firms in country A ( WAkY , k=2,,K)
and country B ( WBjY , j=1,,N) and on the commitment levels of governments A and B (
A
AkY ,
k=1,,K, and BBjY ,  j=1,,N). Similar expressions specify the profits of the other N+K-1 firms
in countries A and B.
The optimal solutions for WAkY , k=1,,K and  
W
BjY , j=1,,N for the profit functions (4)
and (5) are derived in the Appendix. The assumption that all firms in each country are identical
ensures that the exports of all firms in each country are identical. Specifically, profit
maximization by the defense firms in A and B yields the following solution:
15
YWA1 =  θ A0 +θ A1 Y AA1 + θ A2 Y BB1 , (6a)
and
YWB1 =  θ B0 +θ B1 Y AA1 + θ B2 Y BB1 , (6b)
where the parameters 00 >θ A , 00 >θ B , θ A1 , θ A2 , θ B1 , and θ B2  depend on the profit function
((4) or (5)), the parameters of the cost functions of A and B (expression (3)), the parameters of the
demand function of the rest of the world (expression (2)), and the number of firms in each
country (K, N) (see Appendix).
The optimal solutions given by expressions (6a) and (6b) are not dependent on A0α  and
B0α . That is, fixed production cost does not affect the optimal solution in (6) (which equates
marginal cost to marginal revenue). However, the profit-maximizing firm will operate only if its
variable profit exceeds its fixed production cost. In the subsequent analysis, we assume that this
condition holds. Clearly, the value of A0α  and B0α  may affect the number of firms in the defense
industry (the high fixed cost of production of modern weapon systems is one of the major reasons
for the consolidation of the industry, see Flamm (1998)). Fixed production costs may play an
important role in policy decisions if the government can determine the optimal number of firms
in the industry. That is, the optimal value of the objective function according to which the
optimal number of firms is determined may have to be compared across several possible
solutions.
Total sales of the defense good to the rest of the world (by all firms in A and B) are:
B
B
A
A
W
B
W
A
W
B
W
A
W NYKYNYKYYYY 1211011 γγγ ++=+≡+≡ ,        (7)
where the parameters γ 0 >0, γ 1  and γ 2  depend on the type of profit function ((4) or (5)), on the
number of firms in each country, and on the parameters of the cost functions (3) and the demand
function (2).
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Stage 1
Using the security measures (1) and the optimal solution in stage 2 (expressions (6) and
(7)) we obtain the following equilibrium solution for total sales of the defense good to the rest of
the world and the commitment levels of countries A and B (see Appendix):
)1/( 02
0
10 BA
W SSY γγγ −−= ,  (8)
)1/( 02
0
1
0
0 BAA
A
A SSSY γγγ −−= , (9a)
and
).1/( 02
0
1
0
0 BAB
B
B SSSY γγγ −−=  (9b)
Clearly, in equilibrium, the commitment level of each country depends on its target security level
and on the other countrys target security level. This outcome is due to the effect that each
countrys level of security has on its own exports of the defense good to the rest of the world and,
in turn, to the effect of the total quantity of the defense good that is acquired by the rest of the
world on the commitment of each country (see (1)). Finally, WY  is always positive (sinceγ 0 >0)
and, generally, AAY >0 if 
0
AS >0, and 0>
B
BY if 0
0 >BS .
5. Solution of the Model Under different Pricing Practices
The solution of the model depends on the price that each government pays to its own defense
industry for its own purchase of the defense good. We analyze the following three cases:
1. The governments of A and B pay the world price to their defense industries.
2. The governments of A and B pay the marginal cost plus a markup to their defense industries.
3. The government of A (say) pays its defense industry the marginal cost plus a markup and the
government of B pays the world price.
To simplify the analysis we assume that all N+K firms in countries A and B use the same
technology ( jBjA αα = , for j=0,1,2) and, if relevant, markup factor µ.
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Case 1 (the governments of A and B pay the world price)
It is straightforward to show that the government commitment level in country A is a
substitute for the exports of country A (θ A1 <0, see (6a)). To simplify the explanation of this
outcome, but without loss of generality, suppose that marginal cost is fixed. An increase in the
commitment level of the government of country A, AAY , can be supplied only by firms in A. Thus,
the firms in country A increase their sales to their own government. As a result, the marginal
revenue of the firms in A is reduced. To increase their marginal revenue (in order to achieve
MR=MC) they reduce their exports to the rest of the world (by a smaller amount than the
increase in AAY . Hence, the output of the defense industry in country A is higher than before the
increase in AAY ). This reduction in As exports raises the world price for the defense good, which,
in turn, causes the firms in country B to increase their sales to the rest of the world. That is, an
increase in the commitment of government A increases global demand for the defense good (total
demand of country A plus country B plus the rest of the world). Actually, all N+K firms increase
their output by the same amount (the optimization of (4) yields 11 BA YY = ). By the same
argument, the commitment level of government A is a complement of the export of country B
(θ B1 >0, see (6b)).
Global sales, WY , are always positive (sinceγ 0 >0, γ 1 <0 and γ 2 <0). Clearly, 
A
AY >0 if
0
AS >0. Moreover, 
A
AY  increases when 
0
AS  increases or 
0
BS  declines. That is, when country A
increases its target security level, its purchase of the defense good increases, and its firms
decrease their sales to the rest of the world (see expressions (6) and (7)). This increases the world
price of the defense good, causing the firms in B to raise their exports to the rest of the world.
That is, an increase in 0AS  is achieved by increasing As commitment, and reducing As exports to
the rest of the world by more than the increase in Bs exports (in response to the initial reduction
of As exports). Likewise, if government B decides to increase its target security level, its
commitment increases, the world price increases, and the quantity demanded by the rest of the
world decreases, allowing country A to decrease its commitment in order to preserve its
(unchanged) target security level.
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It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium KY ii ∂∂ / >0, and NY ii ∂∂ / >0 for i=A,B.
Clearly, when the number of firms increases, the world price of the defense good, P, declines due
to the increase in competition (decrease in monopoly power). The decline in P results in an
increase in the quantity demanded by the rest of the world and, for given target security levels,
0
AS >0 and 
0
BS >0, an increase in the commitments of both A and B. That is, a more competitive
defense market results in a world with larger amounts of weapon systems.
Case 2 (the governments of A and B pay the marginal cost plus a markup)
First, note that 0212121 ====== γγθθθθ BBAA  when the markup factor, µ, equals
zero, or when marginal production cost is constant ( 022 == BA αα ) (see (6)-(9)). In this case, the
commitment levels AAY  and 
B
BY  are neither substitutes nor complements of the exports of the
defense firms of A and B.  Additionally, in this case the sales of the defense good to the rest of
the world do not depend on the target security levels of countries A and B (that is, 0γ=WY ).
Suppose that the marginal production costs are increasing ( 0  and 0 22 >> BA αα ). Here,
in contrast to case 1, in which the governments of A and B pay the world price for their defense
goods, the commitment level of government A is a complement of the exports of the defense
firms of country A ( A1θ >0) and a substitute for the exports of the defense firms of country B
( B1θ <0). The explanation of this outcome is as follows. An increase in the quantity requested by
government A, AAY , can be supplied only by firms in A. Thus, the firms of country A increase
their production in response to an increase in the commitment level of their government and,
hence, increase their marginal production cost of the last unit that they produce by A2α , which is
less than A2)1( αµ+ , the increase in their marginal revenue. Thus, the firms of country A increase
their exports (an activity which lowers their marginal revenue) in order to equate their marginal
revenue to their marginal cost. This change reduces the world price of the defense good,
triggering a decline in Bs marginal revenue which, in turn, causes the firms in B to reduce their
exports to the rest of the world.
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Clearly, iiY >0 if 
0
iS >0. Here, in contrast to the case where the governments of A and B
purchase their commitments at the equilibrium world price, AAY  increases when 
0
BS  increases.
That is, if country B decides to increase its target security level, its government commitment
increases, the world price declines and the quantity demanded by the rest of the world increases,
forcing country A to increase its commitment in order to preserve its (unchanged) target security
level. When country A increases its target security level, its purchase of the defense good
increases, and its firms increase their sales to the rest of the world (see expressions (6)-(9)). That
is, the increase in 0AS  is achieved by increasing As commitment and increasing As exports (by a
smaller amount). At the same time Bs exports to the rest of the world are reduced (since the
world price of the defense good is reduced).
It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium KY ii ∂∂ / >0 and NY ii ∂∂ / >0 for i=A,B.
Clearly, when the number of firms increases, the world price of the defense good, P, declines due
to the increase in competition (decrease in monopoly power). The decline in P results in an
increase in the quantity demanded by the rest of the world and, for given target security levels,
0
AS >0 and 
0
BS >0, an increase in the commitments of both A and B. That is, a more competitive
defense market results in a world with larger amounts of weapon systems.
Case 3 (the government of A pays the marginal cost plus a markup, and the government of B
the world price).
This case is a hybrid of cases 1 and 2. That is, the commitment level of government A is a
complement of the exports of the defense firms of country A ( 01 >Aθ ) and a substitute for the
exports of the defense firms of country B ( 01 <Bθ ). At the same time, the commitment level of
government B is a substitute for its own countrys exports ( 02 <Bθ ) and a complement of the
exports of country A ( 02 >Aθ ). In addition, when the markup factor, µ, equals zero or when
marginal production cost in A is constant ( 02 =Aα ), then the sales of the defense good to the rest
of the world are not dependent on the target security level of country A.
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6.  Industry Profits, Defense Costs and the Number of Defense Firms
Determining the optimal number of firms in its defense industry is an extremely
important government policy issue (Flamm (1998), James (1998b), Markusen (1998), Dvir and
Tishler (2000)). Suppose that government B has set its number of defense firms to be N0. (Large
previous investments in reorganizing its defense industry or in renewing the industrys
technology may be reasons for this commitment. For a discussion of this issue, see Besanko,
Dranove and Shanley (1996).) The optimal choice of K, the number of defense firms in A,
conditional on N0, is dependent on government As objective. Three objective functions are
analyzed here. That is, the government of A may set a value for K according to one of the
following objectives:
1. To maximize the profits of its defense industry.
2. To minimize its cost of purchasing the defense good.
3. To minimize the net defense cost (government expenditure on the defense good minus the
profit of the defense industry) of the country.
To simplify the analysis and presentation, we analyze the model under the assumptions
that the same technology is used in countries A and B ( jjBjA ααα ≡=  for j=0,1,2) and that
marginal production costs are fixed ( A2α = B2α  = 0). Extensive simulated solutions of the model
have shown that these assumptions do not change the nature of the results.
Case 1 (countries A and B purchase the defense good at the world price).
The profit of each firm in country A and B is given by:
11 BA ππ =  = 20
20
)1(
)1(
SKN
S
+++
+−  
b
a 2)1( α−  ,    (10)
where 0S ≡ 0AS + 
0
BS . Profit is always positive because b < 0. Clearly, the profit of a single firm
decreases when the number of firms in either country increases. This is the standard result in a
Cournot game. That is, a larger number of firms implies a lower equilibrium price and lower
21
profits to each firm. Note also that the profits of any single firm are increased by a rise in the
target security level in country A or country B ( 01 / SA ∂∂π >0). That is, a higher target security
level is equivalent to an increase in the demand for the defense good, and thus profits increase.
Unlike the results of the standard Cournot model, the profits of the defense industry are
not necessarily maximized when the number of firms in each country is one. Specifically, the
profits of the defense industry are given by,
11     ,           where BBAABA NK πππππππ ==+= .    (11)
If the number of firms in each country is set to be the same, K=N, then maximal profits to the
industry accrue when N=K=(1+ 0S )/2. If, for example, 5.100 == BA SS , then maximal profits are
obtained when K=N=2. The departure from the standard Cournot solution is due to the shift of
the demand function to the right (left) when price declines (increases), and the requirement that
government commitments are supplied first, prior to sales to the rest of the world5. That is, the
demand for the defense good by the governments of A and B is not downward sloping. Total
world demand (the demand of A, B and the rest of the world) is obtained by shifting the demand
function of the rest of the world to the right by the amount of the commitments of the
governments of A and B.  Note, however, that the maximal price of total world demand equals
the reservation price of the rest of the world (that is, P=a for a quantity less than or equal to the
commitments of A and B, and the slope of the demand function equals b thereafter).
When the number of firms is chosen such that industrys profits are maximized
(N=K=(1+ 0S )/2) we obtain,
b
aSBA 2
)(
)1()max(max
2
10 απππ
−−
+=+≡ . (12)
That is, the maximal profits in (12) equals that of the standard solution of a Cournot game
                                                
5 See the discussion following expressions (6a) and (6b) regarding the effect of fixed production cost on the
optimal number of firms in the defense industry.
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without government commitments multiplied by (1+ 0S ). (For a solution of the case where
0S =0, see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).) Clearly, industry profits are higher in both
countries when the target security level in either of the two countries is higher. In our case,
industry profits may be somewhat lower than those in (12), because the number of firms must be
an integer, and (1+ 0S )/2 is an integer only when 0S  is an odd integer.
Consider the optimal choice of K, the number of defense firms in A, conditional on N0. Our
results show that for all three objective functions, the government of A is likely to set a value for
K that is larger than the optimal K under the standard Cournot solution (K= N0+1) when
000 == BA SS . This outcome is due to the commitment of both A and B to meet target security
levels. The number of firms that maximizes defense industry profits in country A, conditional on
N0, is given by:
.1 00 SNK ++= (13a)
When 000 == BA SS  one obtains K= N
0+1, which is the standard Cournot solution. In our model,
the higher the target security levels in country A and/or B, the larger is the number of firms
required to maximize the profits of country As defense industry. This is because the
commitments of the governments of A and B do not depend directly on the world price.
Next, it is straightforward to show that the number of firms in A that minimizes this
countrys expenditure on the defense good is either K=1 or K→∞.
The number of firms that minimizes net defense cost of A is:
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
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. (13b)
When 000 == BA SS , we get K=N
0+1, which is the standard Cournot solution. Requiring that
1)2/3( α>a  is sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure that 0/
0 >∂∂ NK . This means that the
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optimal K increases when N0 is larger. Note again that, in the solution, K and N must be integers.
Finally, larger values of 0AS  and/or 
0
BS  yield a larger value of K in (13b). That is, an increase in
the target security levels in A or B, will, conditional on N0, increase the number of firms that
minimizes the difference between As expenditure on the defense good and the profits of As
defense industry.
Case 2 (The governments of A and B pay their defense industries marginal cost plus a markup).
The defense industry profits of country A are:
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The expression in the first set of curly brackets in (14) equals As profits from sales to the rest of
the world (at the world price). The second part of (14) stands for the profits on sales to
government A. In this case, for a given N0, the value of K that maximizes Aπ , the profits of the
defense industry of country A, is given by the standard Cournot solution 10 += NK .
The expenditure of government A on the defense good is:
AGC  = b
a
KN
KNS A
)(
)1(
)()1( 101
−
++
+
+
α
αµ . (15)
For a given N0, 0/ >∂∂ KGCA . Hence, government expenditures on the defense good are
minimized when K=1. The reason for this result is as follows. Smaller K (and, equivalently,
smaller N) result in a higher world price for the defense good because smaller K and N imply
greater monopoly power. Therefore, less of the defense good is purchased by the rest of the
world. This, in turn, means that governments A and B can attain a given target security level with
a lower purchasing commitment.
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The net defense cost of A is not dependent on the markup factor since the profit of the
defense industry from sales to its own government (see the second part of (14)) are part of the
government expenditure on the defense good. That is,
2
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SKNKNKa
b
aGC AAA
ααα
π . (16)
The value of K that minimizes AAGC π− , given N
0, is:
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Clearly, 00 =AS  yields K= N
0+1. Here, the following optimal K emerges:
11 0 +≤≤ NK when
1
10
α
α−
<
aS A . (18a)
and
K=1 when
1
10
α
α−
>
aS A .   (18b)
That is, the optimal K is, generally, less than the standard result of a Cournot model. When As
target security level is relatively large, the value of K that minimizes AAGC π− , given N
0, is one.
Case 3 (government A pays its defense industry marginal cost plus a markup and government B
pays its defense industry the world price).
When 022 == BA αα ,  111 ααα == BA , we have:
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and
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Clearly, the profits of the defense industry of country A are equal to or higher than those of
country B (they are equal when µ=0).  Suppose that 0NN = is given. What is the optimal K?
0/ =∂∂ KAπ  yields:
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Clearly, 0=µ  yields 00 1 BSNK ++= . Setting 0>µ , and )1( 01 ASa µα +>  yields
00 1 BSNK ++> . In addition, it is straightforward to show that, for a given 0NN = , AGC  is
minimized at K=1. Finally,  0/)( =∂−∂ KGC AA π  yields,
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000 == BA SS  yields 1
0 += NK . 0  and  0 00 >> BA SS yields K>0, but K may be larger or smaller
than N+1 depending on the size of  00   and  BA SS .
Similarly, suppose that 0KK =  is given, and country B can choose N, the number of its
defense firms. The optimal value of N which maximizes profits, minimizes government
expenditure, or minimizes BBGC π− , conditional on 
0KK = , is the same as that in Case 2 when
K and N are interchanged and when 0BS  replaces 
0S .
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7.  Comparison of Solutions Across Pricing Practices
The optimal pricing practice of governments A and B for the purchase of the defense good
from their own defense industries depends on the objectives of those governments. Here, we
assume that a government chooses a particular pricing practice depending on the pricing practice
of the other government and one of the following criteria: (1) maximization of the profits of its
defense industry, (2) minimization of its cost of purchasing the defense good and, (3)
minimization of its net defense cost. Next, we compare the solution of the model for the above
three objectives across various pricing practices.
To make the comparison both simple and meaningful, we assume that A and B use the
same technology and that marginal cost is fixed (that is, 111 ααα ≡= BA  and 022 == BA αα ). In
addition, profits are dependent on the number of firms in each industry. Generally, if both
countries use the same technology, higher profits will accrue to the industry with the larger
number of firms. Thus, in the following analysis we assume that N=K.
Denote the profits of the defense industries of A and B by kAπ  and 
k
Bπ , where k denotes
the pricing practice (k=1 when both governments pay the world price, k=2 when both
governments pay marginal cost plus a markup, and k=3 when government A pays marginal cost
plus a markup and government B pays the world price). Similarly, denote the government
expenditures of A and B by kAGC  and 
k
BGC . We shall start by comparing the profits of the
defense industry of A across different objectives of the government of A.
Clearly, 2Aπ  depends on the value of the markup factor µ. It is easy to show that very
large µ may result in 12 AA ππ > , in which case, government A will be paying more than the world
price. In practice, the governments reason for setting the price of the defense good as equal to
the marginal production cost plus a markup is to pay less than the world price. Hence, it is
reasonable to assume that the firms profit margin per unit of defense good from sales to their
government is not larger than their profit margin from sales to the rest of the world. That is,
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11 αµα −≤ P , where P is the world price. Then,
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and (see (10)),
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Expressions (22) and (23) imply
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Then, since N=K, formula (24) implies
 1for     1        5.100 ≥<⇒<= NSS BA ξ ,
 2for     1        5.700 ≥<⇒<= NSS BA ξ ,
 3for     1       5.1700 ≥<⇒<= NSS BA ξ .
Hence, in most situations we shall obtain 12 AA ππ < . That is, when the number of firms is given,
and the objective of both governments A and B is to maximize the profit of their defense
industries, they will prefer to pay the world price for their purchases of the defense good.
Now consider government expenditure on the defense good. Again, it is a simple matter
to show that a very large markup factor, µ, yields 12 AA GCGC > .  However, if the markup factor is
small, we have  12 AA GCGC < . Formally, the conditions µ=0 and )1)(1(/ 001 µα +++> BA SSa
are sufficient (but not necessary) to yield 12 AA GCGC < .
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Clearly, if the pricing practices are compared on the basis of defense industry profits, or
government expenditure on the defense good, the result will be dependent on the markup factor.
The more natural objective is to minimize the net defense cost to the country. First, note that
22
AAGC π−  is not dependent on the markup factor. Consider the case when 
00
BA SS = . It is shown
in the Appendix that the conditions, 5.0200 +≤= NSS BA , or 5.0
200 +>= NSS BA  together with
484/ 21 ++≤ NNa α , are sufficient, but not necessary, for
2211
AAAA GCGC ππ −<− . (25)
That is, when the governments objective is to minimize net defense cost, they prefer to pay the
world price for their own defense good rather than the marginal production cost plus a markup.
Consider case 3 (the government of A pays the marginal cost plus a markup and the
government of B pays the world price). It is straightforward to show that at the optimum,
1111 B
B
B
W
B
W
A YYYY ≡+= . That is, the exports of each firm in country A equal production of each
firm in country B.  Also, it is obvious that government expenditure on the defense good in
country A is lower than that in country B if the unit price that it pays to its defense firms is less
than the world price. In this case, and for any markup, we have:
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BBAA GCGC ππ −<− . (26)
That is, the net defense cost of country A is smaller than that of country B.
Suppose that A is committed to its pricing practice. That is, government A pays on the
basis of marginal cost plus a markup, regardless of the pricing practice chosen by government B.
Which pricing practice is best for government B in this case? The following results hold:
1. For µ=0 (no markup) we have 23 BB ππ > . However, for a sufficiently large µ , 23 BB ππ < .
2. Generally, a sufficiently small markup factor, µ, yields 23 BB GCGC < . However, for a
sufficiently large µ we have 23 BB GCGC > .
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3. For some values of the models parameters, Bs net defense cost is minimized when it pays its
defense industry the marginal cost plus a markup. For other values of the models parameters,
Bs net defense cost is minimized when it pays its defense industry the world price.
Finally, if A is committed to paying the world price for the purchase of the defense good from
its own defense industry, B is always better off if it also pays the world price. Thus, when
governments independently choose procurement rules such that their net defense cost is
minimized, the model may exhibit two different equilibrium points. If one country commits to
paying the world price, so will the other country. If one government commits to paying marginal
cost plus a markup, the other country may choose to pay its defense industry the marginal cost
plus a markup or the world price, depending on the models parameters.
8. Different Technologies, R&D, and Defense Industry Exports
Whether they are for civilian or defense use, technologies that are based on R&D are
generally non-rival (their use by one firm does not limit their use by another). This means that the
availability of these technologies will bring about strong spillovers across firms (see Romer
(1990)). When defense R&D spillover across countries is not allowed (see Dvir and Tishler
(2000) on this issue), countries with a large expenditure on R&D may gain a substantial
technological advantage over countries that spend less on R&D (see Romer (1990), Leahy and
Neary (1997), Goolsbee (1998) and Segerstrom (1998)).
In the current paper this technological advantage is reflected in the parameters of the cost
function, formula (3) (for a general discussion, analysis, and examples of defense R&D, see
Nelson (1993), Tishler et. al (1996), Serfati (1998), James (1998a), Ham and Mowery (1998) and
Dvir and Tishler (2000)). Suppose that the government of country A spends more on defense
R&D than the government of country B. There may be various reasons for such asymmetry. For
example, As GDP may be larger than Bs, or country A may perceive a greater security threat
than country B ( 00 BA SS > ). In reality, both of these reasons drive the US to spend much more on
defense R&D than Europe (see Flamm (1988), James (1998a), Markusen (1998) and Serfati
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(1998)). Even if 00 BA SS ≤ , country A may be technologically more advanced than country B.
Clearly, government expenditure on defense R&D should be promoted because spending by
private defense firms in countries A and B will be less than the countrys optimal level (see
Goolsbee (1998)). Thus, government expenditure on R&D is critical for advancing a countrys
defense technology know-how, particularly when defense R&D spillover across countries is not
allowed. However, see Segerstrom (1998) for cases where the social rate of return on R&D
spending does not exceed the private rate of return.
Suppose that countries A and B pay the world price to their own defense industries. For
simplicity of exposition, but without loss of generality, set N=K, 00 BA SS = , and consider the case
of fixed marginal cost, 022 == BA αα . Suppose that country A spends more on R&D than
country B, resulting in BA 11 αα < . Using expressions (6)-(8), it can be shown that,
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=− . (28)
Thus, country As exports of the defense good will exceed those of country B. Expression (27)
shows that the lower is the marginal cost of production in country A relative to that in country B,
the larger is country As share in the world market. That is, following common sense, more
efficient (less costly) production confers greater market power. More specifically, if AB 11 αα −  is
significant, even a small N may lead to WWA YY ≈ . The role of the cost differentials becomes
more important as the number of defense firms increases since the excess exports of a single firm
in country A over a single firm in country B are independent of the number of firms in each
country. Hence, a larger number of firms in both producing countries increases country As share
in the world market. This conclusion can be inferred directly from (28).
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9. Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents a simple model that analyzes the interactions of two countries
defense needs with the market structure of their defense industries. We assume that the target
security level in each country is (exogenously) determined by military and political decision
makers who assess the countries potential enemies. In addition, the number of defense firms in
each country is known and given exogenously. The decisions in this model are taken in two
stages. In stage 1, each of the two governments commits to the amount of the defense good that it
will purchase from its defense industry. In stage 2, given the commitments of the governments to
purchase the defense good from their own defense industries, and the rest of the worlds demand
for the defense good, the defense firms play a Cournot game to decide how much to produce and
sell to the rest of the world in order to maximize their profits.
This paper shows that the concentration of all the major defense firms in the US and
Western Europe, and the consolidation of the defense industries into a highly concentrated
oligopoly play an important role in determining procurement levels, as well as defense policies,
in the US and Europe. The main results of this arrangement are as follows.
1. Generally, the quantity of the defense good in the world is lower when the governments of
producing countries pay the world price to their defense manufacturers than when they pay
marginal cost plus a markup.
2. The net defense costs to a producing country (the government expenditure on the defense
good minus the defense industrys profit) are lower when both governments pay the world
price to their defense industries.
3. More competitive defense industries (a larger number of defense firms in the producing
countries) reduce the world price of the defense good, and thus bring about more sales of the
defense good to the producing countries as well as to the rest of the world.
4. Predetermined target levels of security affect the optimal number of firms in each of the
producing countries. Generally, higher security levels result in a larger number of defense
firms in each country.
5. If the production of the defense good in one of the producing countries is significantly more
32
efficient than that of the other country (due to a larger investment in R&D, say), the more
efficient country may capture most or all of the exports to the rest of the world. The larger the
number of defense firms in each of the two producing countries, the more pronounced this
phenomenon becomes.
Finally, the results of this study may help to guide policy analysis. First, consolidation of
defense firms is seen in the US and Western Europe as a way of reducing procurement costs and
sustaining a viable defense industry during a period of declining defense budgets. This paper
provides an additional explanation of the consolidation process. We show that government
expenditure on the defense good and net defense cost are smaller when the number of defense
firms in each country is relatively small. A smaller number of firms means a higher world price
for the defense good which, in turn, results in lower sales of the defense good to the rest of the
world. As a consequence, a lower commitment is required of the governments of the US and
Western Europe to achieve predetermined target security levels. Thus, cooperation between the
US and Western Europe will be beneficial to both. Allowing defense firms to consolidate across
the Atlantic will reduce the total number of defense firms in the world, while increasing the size
of the remaining firms. This will reduce the net defense costs of Western Europe and the US, at
the same time raising the world price for the defense good, thus reducing the stock of weapon
systems in the rest of the world. Second, the governments of the US and Western Europe should
consider paying the world price (rather than marginal cost plus a markup) to their defense
industries, thus reducing their own net defense costs.
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Appendix (SDI  20)
Case 1 (the governments of A and B pay their defense industries the world price).
A. Stage 2
The profit function of the first firm in country A is given by:
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Solving (A2) and (A4) for YWA1 and YWB1  yields:
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Using (A5) and (A6) we obtain ( WB
W
B
W
A
W
A NYYKYY 11   and  ≡≡ ):
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B. Stage 1
Actual security levels are given by:
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Target security levels in countries A and B are 0AS  and 
0
BS .
Now, using the optimal level of WB
W
A
W YYY +≡ , given by (A7), in (A9), and denoting
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Solving (A10a) and (A10b) for AAY  and 
B
BY  yields:
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By assumption, all firms in each country are identical, hence,
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B
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B
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Using (A11) in (A7) implies:
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Substituting (A11) into (A5), we obtain total production of each firm in country A:
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III.  Evaluation of 1Aπ , 1AA Kππ ≡ , AGC  and AAGC π−
Assumptions: (1) Countries A and B use the same technology (this assumption is denoted ST).
(2) Marginal production costs are fixed (denoted FMC). That is, 111 ααα ≡= BA , and
022 == BA αα .
Using assumptions FMC and ST in (A8) implies:
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Using FMC and ST in (A5) yields:
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Using (A11) in (A15) and simplifying (or, using FMC and ST in (A13)) yields:
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where
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Using 2,1,0, =iiγ , given in (A14), in (A12) yields:
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World price, P, is given by
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ST and FMT imply .)( 111 AA YP απ −=  Hence, Using (A18) and (A19) to evaluate 1Aπ , we have:
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Given 0NN = , the value of K that maximizes Aπ  in (A20) is obtained by solving for K such that
.0/ =∂∂ KAπ  This yields:
00 1 SNK ++= . (A21)
It is straightforward to verify that 0/ 22 <∂∂ KAπ  at 00 1 SNK ++= .
Government As expenditure on the defense good equals: AAA YPGC ⋅= . Using (A19) and (A11):
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Solving for K such that 0/ =∂∂ KGCA  in (A22) yields (given 0NN = ):
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K in (A23) is the maximal value of AGC  ( 0/
22 <∂∂ KGCA  at K defined by (A23)). The minimal
value of AGC in (A22) is obtained at one of the extremes: K=1 or K→∞  (K→∞ implies
baSGC AA /)( 1
0
1 −= αα ).
Net defense cost, AAGC π−  (where Aπ  is defined in (A20b) and AGC  is given in (A22)),
equals:
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0/)( =∂−∂ KGC AA π , for 0NN = , yields,
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Using (A25b) we observe that the condition  )2/3( 1α>a is sufficient (not necessary) for 0 2 >τ ,
and 12α>a  is sufficient (not necessary) for 12 >τ . Note that if 12 >τ , an equilibrium exists
only if 01 <τ .
Case 2  (the governments of A and B pay their defense industries marginal cost plus a mark- up)
I. Stage 2
The profit function of the first firm in country A is given by:
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1Bπ = [ a + b(YWB1 +∑
=
K
j
W
BjY
2
+∑
=
N
j
W
AjY
1
)]YWB1  + BB
W
B
B
BBB YYY 11121 )]()[1( +++ ααµ
         ])()([ 2112211110
W
B
B
BB
W
B
B
BBB YYYY ++++− ααα (A28)
0/ 11 =∂∂ WBB Yπ  ⇒  WA
B
B
B
B
B
B
BW
B YbN
KbY
bNbN
aY 1
2
1
2
2
2
1
1 )1()1()1(
 
αα
µα
α
α
−+
−
+
−+
−
+
−+
−
= . (A29)
Solving (A27) and (A28) for WAY 1 and YWB1  yields:
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Using (A30) and (A31) we obtain ( WB
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II. Stage 1
Using the definitions of security in (A9), and the results in (A30) and (A31), yields:
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and (since all firms in each country are identical),
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III.  Evaluation of 1Aπ , 1AA Kππ ≡ , AGC  and AAGC π−
Assumptions: (1) Countries A and B use the same technology (this assumption is denoted ST).
(2) Marginal production costs are fixed (denoted FMC). That is, 111 ααα ≡= BA , and
022 == BA αα .
Under these assumptions, (A30), (A34) and (A35) yield:
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Hence, the world price of the defense good is:
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The profit of the first firm in A is:
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Using (A36), (A37) and (A40) in (A41) we have
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and  1AA Kππ = , that is,
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Given 0NN = , the value of K that maximizes Aπ  in (A43) is obtained by solving for K such that
.0/ =∂∂ KAπ  This yields:
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It is straightforward to verify that 0/ 22 <∂∂ KAπ  at this point (if K>0, that is, )1( 01 ASa µα +> ).
Clearly, 0=µ  yields 10 += NK . 0>µ  and )1( 01 ASa µα +>  imply that 10 +> NK .
Government As expenditure on the defense good is AAA YGC 1)1( αµ+= . Using (A37) yields:
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To find K such that AGC  is minimized for a given 
0NN = , we differentiate AGC  w.r.t. K to get
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Hence, AGC  is minimized at K=1.
Using (A43) and (A45) we obtain AAGC π− as follows:
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To find the value of K, for a given 0NN = , that minimizes AAGC π−  we set
0/)( =∂−∂ KGC AA π  to obtain
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where 1<ψ . Two possibilities arise:
 11      10     1/0 01
0 +<≤⇒<<⇒−<< NKaS A ψα ,  (A49a)
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43
Case 3 (country A pays marginal cost plus a mark-up and B pays the world price)
A.  Stage 2
The profit function of the first firm in country A is given by (A26) and the profit function of the
first firm in country B is given by (A3). Profit maximization yields WAY 1  as in (A30) and 
W
BY 1  as in
(A6).
B.   Stage 1
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where 0γ is given by (A8a), 1γ  is given by (A33b) and 2γ  is given by (A8c).
Assumptions: (1) Countries A and B use the same technology (this assumption is denoted ST).
(2) Marginal production costs are fixed (denoted FMC). That is, 111 ααα ≡= BA , and
022 == BA αα .
These assumptions imply that 0γ  and 2γ  are given by (A14), respectively, and 01 =γ .
Using (A50) we obtain:
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Using (A51)-(A54) we obtain:
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Now, suppose that K is given. What is the optimal N?
Comparing (A57) to (A20) and (A58) to (A22) shows that the two pairs of expressions are
identical except that 0S  in (A20) and (A22) is replaced by 0BS . Hence, the optimal values of N
for maximum profits, minimum government expenditure on the defense good, and minimum net
defense cost are given by (A21), (A23) and (A25), respectively, when K and N are interchanged
and when 0BS  replaces 
0S .
Similarly, suppose that 0NN =  is given. What is the optimal K?
Using (A56), 0/ =∂∂ KAπ  yields:
0
0
11
0
110
0
11
0
11
)(
)(
)1(
)(
)( N
Sa
SaS
Sa
SaK
A
A
B
A
A
µαα
µαα
µαα
µαα
−−
+−
++
−−
+−
= . (A60)
It is straightforward to verify that 0/ 22 <∂∂ KAπ  at this point (if K>0, that is, )1( 01 ASa µα +> ).
Clearly, 0=µ  yields 00 1 BSNK ++= . 0>µ  and )1( 01 ASa µα +>  imply that 00 1 BSNK ++> .
To find K to minimize AGC  for a given 
0NN = , we differentiate AGC  in (A58) w.r.t. K to get
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and, clearly, 0/ 22 <∂∂ KGC . Hence, AGC  is minimized at K=1.
Using (A56) and (A58) yields:
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0/)( =∂−∂ KGC AA π  yields
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The condition 000 == BA SS  yields 1
0 += NK . 0  and  0 00 >> BA SS  yield K>0, but K may be
larger or smaller than 10 +N depending on the size of  00   and  BA SS .
Assume that 00 BA SS =  and N=K. Then,
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That is, country A is better off.
Comparison of profits, government expenditure and net profit among price practices
Denote the profit of the defense industry by kAπ , where k denotes the pricing practice (k=1 when
both governments pay the world price, k=2 when both governments pay marginal cost plus a
markup, k=3 when the government of country A pays marginal cost plus a markup and the
government of country B pays its defense industry the world price, and k=4 when the government
of A pays its defense industry the world price and the government of B pays its defense industry
marginal cost plus a markup). Similarly, denote the government expenditure of A by kAGC  . We
start by comparing profits across price practices 1 and 2.
Using (A43) and )( 11 αµα −≤ P  (profit margins under price practice 2 are not larger than those
under pricing practice 1), we have
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Using (A20) and (A43) we have
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12 / AA ππ  may be larger or smaller than one. However, when N=K and 
00
BA SS = , 
12 / AA ππ  tends to
be less than 1, that is 12 AA ππ < . Specifically, using (A66) one obtains 0/)/(
12 <∂∂ NAA ππ  and,
5.100 <= BA SS        ⇒     
12
AA ππ <     for  N ≥ 1,
5.700 <= BA SS        ⇒    
12
AA ππ <     for  N ≥ 2,
5.1700 <= BA SS       ⇒    
12
AA ππ <     for  N ≥ 3.
Using (A22) and (A45) it is easy to observe that for a sufficiently large mark-up, µ, 21 AA GCGC < .
When µ=0, 12 AA GCGC <  if
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The relation between 1AGC  and 
2
AGC  when µ=0 is not simple because it depends on many
parameters. However, when N=K, (A67) can be rewritten as follows:
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and 3/2/ 01 Sa +>α  is sufficient for (A68) to hold. That is, N=K and  3/2/
0
1 Sa +>α  imply
that 12 AA GCGC < .
Using (A24) and (A47) we have
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After some manipulations of (A69) we get
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Using (A70) we observe that:
1. If 10 >S , then 2120 +< NS  is sufficient (but not necessary) for 0>ψ .
2. For any value of 0S , 484/ 21 ++< NNa α   is sufficient (but not necessary) for 0>ψ .
That is, we expect that in most cases )()( 2211 AAAA GCGC ππ −<− .
We continue by comparing price practices for k=3 and k=4. Suppose that country A is committed
to pay its industry marginal cost plus mark-up. Then, if country B chooses to pay its industry
marginal cost plus mark-up, Bπ  and BGC  are given by (see (A42), (A45)):
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If B chooses to pay its industry the world price then 31
3
BB Nππ =  where 
3
1Bπ  is given by (A57) and
3
BGC  is given by (A59). Clearly, for large µ we have, 23 BB ππ < . For µ=0 we have 23 BB ππ > .
Similar conclusion holds for BGC  (since 1α>a ).
Define )()( 3322 BBBB GCGC ππξ −−−≡ . It is straightforward to show that, depending on the
models parameters, ξ  may be less than, equal to, or greater than zero.
Suppose that country B is committed to pay the world price to its industry. Then, if A chooses to
pay the world price to its defense industry, 1Aπ  and 
1
AGC  are given by (see (A20), (A22)):
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For large µ we have, 31 AA ππ < . For µ=0 we have 31 AA ππ > . For large µ we have  31 AA GCGC < .
When µ=0, the relation between 31   and  AA GCGC  is dependent on the values of several
parameters.
Again, suppose that A chooses to pay the world price to its defense industry. Using (A73) and
(A74), net defense cost is given by (see (A24)),
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Whereas when A chooses to pay marginal cost plus markup we have (see (A56) and (A58)):
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(A75) and (A76) have the same functional form with 0BS  in (A76) and 
0S  in (A75). Clearly,
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where,
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Hence, 0<Φ . Thus, 4411 BBBB GCGC ππ −<− .
That is, B is better off paying the world price to its defense industry.
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